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ABSTRACT 
Accurate  estimates of  f u t u r e  popula t ions  are o u t  o f  reach  
o f  p r e s e n t  t echniques ;  t h e  methods a c t u a l l y  used,  however they 
are desc r ibed ,  are e x t r a p o l a t i o n s  o f  p a s t  t r e n d s  and cannot  
a n t i c i p a t e  t u r n i n g  p o i n t s  i n  b i r t h s  o r  o t h e r  components. The 
p r e s e n t  paper  i s  no except ion .  I t  summarizes t h e  e r r o r s  o f  p a s t  
work i n  t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n  t h a t  t h e s e  w i l l  i n d i c a t e  t h e  accuracy of  
t h e  f i g u r e s  h e r e  conta ined .  The method used i n  t h i s  paper  i s  t o  
suppose sone y e a r  i n  which each country  w i l l  a t t a i n , b a r e  r ep l ace -  
ment (an average of  about  2.3 c h i l d r e n  p e r  f e r t i l e  couple )  a long  
wi th  a smooth t r a n s i t i o n  t o  t h a t  c o n d i t i o n ,  and a cont inuance  o f  
replacement u n t i l  t h e  age  d i s t r i b u t i o n  s t a b i l i z e s  and t h e  popu- 
l a t i o n  becomes s t a t i o n a r y .  For most c o u n t r i e s  w e  took t h e  t u r n  
of t h e  cen tury  as about  t h e  t i m e  when replacement would be  
reached.  E s t i m a t e s  o f  popula t ion  and l a b o r  f o r c e  are shown by 
age and s e x  a t  25 y e a r  i n t e r v a l s  f o r  150 c o u n t r i e s ;  groupings 
are given by c o n t i n e n t  and degree  o f  development. P r i n t o u t s  are 
a v a i l a b l e  showing much more d e t a i l  t han  w e  have been a b l e  t o  pub- 
l i s h  i n  t h i s  working paper.  
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1. POPULATION AND I T S  ANOMALIES 
Populat ion has  been an important  p a r t  of t h e  work a t  IIASA 
from t h e  s t a r t .  New and powerful techniques have been developed 
f o r  t h e  a n a l y s i s  of migra t ion  and o t h e r  components of  popula t ion  
change, and they have been appl ied  t o  t h e  d a t a  of many c o u n t r i e s .  
The p r e s e n t  work e s t i m a t e s  p r e s e n t  and p rospec t ive  popula- 
t i o n  f o r  a l l  c o u n t r i e s  of over 250,000 popula t ion ,  .using a  simple 
and uniform technique of p r o j e c t i o n ,  and showing r e s u l t s  by age,  
sex ,  and l abor  f o r c e  f o r  each country.  W e  in t roduce  t h e  numeri- 
c a l  estimates by s tudy  of t r e n d s  i n  t h e  components of popula t ion  
growth-birth, dea th ,  migration-and precede t h a t  by a  review o f  
some of  t h e  s p e c i a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  t h a t  a  s t u d e n t  of  popula t ion  has 
t o  f ace ,  whether he wishes t o  f o r e c a s t  t h e  f u t u r e  o r  merely t o  
r e l a t e  popula t ion  t c  o t h e r  s o c i a l  v a r i a b l e s .  Every s e r i o u s  d i s -  
cuss ion  of popula t ion  has t o  reckon wi th  i t s  mul t ip l e  f a c e t s  and 
t h e  paradoxes t o  which t h e s e  g ive  r i s e .  
People a r e  both t h e  purpose of product ion and i t s  agents .  
One's view of how many people  t h e r e  ought t o  be depends on which 
of t h e s e  a s p e c t s  one i s  looking a t :  product ion o r  consumption. 
No such ambiguity a r i s e s  f o r  o t h e r  r e sea rch  f ie lds- the  more food 
t h e  b e t t e r ;  t h e  more energy t h e  b e t t e r .  More people permit  
greater division of labor and hence greater social product, yet 
the limits of the milieu come closer as population grows. One 
who sees the division of labor as dominant will favor a larger 
population while one concerned with the milieu will favor a 
smaller. 
Technical advance and capital have been feared because they 
would displace people in production, and that fear is still wide- 
spread; in an extreme version machines seem like quasi-humans 
competing with people for a place in the world. Yet it is the 
countries with the most capital that have also the lowest unem- 
ployment and correspondingly the most conspicuous need for people. 
The paradox goes further. The need for people in the 
capital-rich countries does not translate into large families; 
in those countries the very demand for labor reduces the birth 
rate. This perverse result occurs because the plentiful jobs 
to be filled draw women into the labor force, and childbearing 
takes second place to careers. On the other side the countries 
that have the hardest time making use of their citizens are the 
ones producing the most children. 
We tell people that economic development is a goal so impor- 
tant that it justifies any amount of hard work and abstention 
from consumption in this generation. The history of England, 
the United States, and the USSR show how demanding the process 
of development is, and how little is the immediate gratification 
available to those who accomplish it. Yet more than half of the 
work force of this generation will be dead within the next 35 
years, before full development can occur. The chief beneficia- 
ries will be the children and grandchildren of those now working 
and saving. Then should not people have many children, so that 
at least there will be many to benefit from.the hardships that 
are inevitable at the initiation of development? No, for re- 
straint in childbearing is as important for development as re- 
straint in consumption. All this is hard for many of the world's 
poor to understand. 
The transition from a human population of 1 billion on the 
planet to some 10 billion in a sense underlies all the other 
t r a n s i t i o n s  t ak ing  p l a c e  between t h e  18th and t h e  21s t  century.  
Populat ion growth p u t s  stress on food s u p p l i e s  and hence on land;  
it i s  t h e  u rgen t  reason  why c a p i t a l  i s  a t  once badly needed and 
d i f f i c u l t  t o  accumulate. Populat ion has  much of t h e  responsi-  
b i l i t y  f o r  shor t ages  of  energy and m a t e r i a l s ;  it must have some 
r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  crowding of  p u b l i c  f a c i l i t i e s .  Increased  popu- 
l a t i o n  and hence more i n t e n s i v e  use o f  land  nakes d e t e r i o r a t i o n  
of  t h a t  l a n d  and sporad ic  o r  permanent bar renness  more l i k e l y ,  
a s  w e l l  a s  more s e r i o u s  when it does t a k e  p l ace  i n  p ropor t ion  t o  
t h e  number of people  whose l i v i n g  depends on it. 
The d i v i s i o n  of t h e  p l a n e t  i n t o  c o u n t r i e s  wi th  r a t e s  of in-  
c r e a s e  of  2 percen t  o r  more, on t h e  one hand, and c o u n t r i e s  wi th  
v i r t u a l l y  ze ro  i n c r e a s e  on t h e  o t h e r ,  te l ls  us t h a t  t h e  most i m -  
p o r t a n t  datum f o r  popula t ion  a n a l y s i s  and f o r e c a s t i n g  i s  t h e  
movement of  c o u n t r i e s  from t h e  one ca tegory  t o  t h e  o t h e r .  When 
people  a r e  poor a  smal l  i n c r e a s e  i n  income i s  l i k e l y  t o  be turned  
i n t o  c h i l d r e n ,  through more babies  surv iv ing;  when they  a r e  w e l l  
on t h e  pa th  o f  development a  smal l  i n c r e a s e  of income i s  l i k e l y  
t o  be turned i n t o  a  f a l l  of  t h e  b i r t h  r a t e .  A t  some p o i n t  i n  t h e  
i n c r e a s e  of  income a  f l i p  occurs ,  and what was a  p o s i t i v e  e f f e c t  
of  income on popula t ion  becomes a  nega t ive  one. 
I f  two v a r i a b l e s ,  income and number of c h i l d r e n ,  a r e  posi-  
t i v e l y  c o r r e l a t e d  up t o  a  c e r t a i n  t i m e ,  when they  reach  a  thresh-, 
o l d ,  and then beyond t h i s  t h r e s h o l d - s t a r t  t o  be  nega t ive ly  cor re-  
l a t e d ,  f o r e c a s t i n g  is  e s p e c i a l l y  d i f f i c u l t .  W e  do n o t  know q u i t e  
how o r  when a  count ry  rises above t h e  l e v e l  of poverty  where 
popula t ion  grows r a p i d l y  and c a s i t a l  very l i t t l e ,  t o  t h e  a f f l u e n t  
cond i t ion  i n  which popula t ion  i s  udder c o n t r o l  and c a p i t a l  accu- 
mulates  r ap id ly .  Such even t s  a s  t h e  d iscovery  of some new n a t u r a l  
resource ,  o r  t h e  advent  o f  an e n e r g e t i c  l e a d e r ,  perhaps adopt ion 
of a  r e l i g i o n  of  abs t inence  and hard work l i k e  Puri tanism,  can 
t r i g g e r  t h e  advent  of  development, and make previous f o r e c a s t s  
of popula t ion  wor th less .  The e s t ima tes  of t h i s  paper ,  l i k e  a l l  
o t h e r s ,  a r e  i n e v i t a b l y  s u b j e c t  t o  such a  r i s k .  
W e  proceed t o  review b r i e f l y  c u r r e n t  t r e n d s  i n  m o r t a l i t y ,  
f e r t i l i t y ,  and migra t ion ,  recognizing t h a t  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  on t h e  
causes  of  m o r t a l i t y  and on f e r t i l i t y  d e c l i n e  and of t h e  numerical  
tendencies  t o  d a t e  i s  t oo  r i c h  t o  be captured i n  t h e s e  few pages. 
We present  our  b e s t  es t imate ,  and compare t h a t  with o t h e r  e s t i -  
mates, f o r  each country of over 250,000 populat ion,  then d i scuss  
t h e  probable e r r o r  of such es t imates .  Population p o l i c i e s  and 
t h e i r  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  cannot be disregarded by t h e  f o r e c a s t e r ,  and 
we mention them b r i e f l y  f o r  a few coun t r i e s .  
1.1. Mor ta l i ty  
The demographic t r a n s i t i o n  i s  i n i t i a t e d  by t h e  f a l l  i n  t h e  
death r a t e ,  a f a l l  whose causes a r e  n o t  y e t  d isentangled .  Medi- 
c a l  advance has s t e a d i l y  cumulated from t h e  f i r s t  i n t roduc t ion  
of vacc ina t ion ,  bu t  t h e  f a l l  i n  t h e  death r a t e  does no t  seem t o  
have waited f o r  t h a t .  The ending of t h e  plagues t h a t  were s o  
l a r g e  a f a c t o r  i n  European m o r t a l i t y  from t h e  14th t o  t h e  17th 
century had l i t t l e  t o  do wi th  t h e  advance of medical knowledge, 
bu t  was due r a t h e r  t o  an eco log ica l  change i n  which one kind of 
r a t  drove ou t  another  from human se t t lements .  I n  r e c e n t  years  
medicine has played i t s  p a r t ,  along with e a r l i e r  f a c t o r s  of  i m -  
proved s a n i t a t i o n  and improved d i e t .  Nu t r i t ion  seems t o  have 
been important,  not  s o  much because people d i e  d i r e c t l y  of s t a r -  
va t ion ,  bu t  because they  a r e  weakened by l ack  of an adequate and 
var ied  d i e t  and t h e r e f o r e  suscep t ib le  t o  d isease .  
The n e t  r e s u l t  of a l l  t h e  changes has been a r a p i d l y  spread- 
i n g  improvement i n  m o r t a l i t y  condi t ions.  Expectation of  l i f e  a t  
age zero i s  a s  good a measure a s  any of t h e  progress  t h a t  has been 
made and expected. I n  p r i m i t i v e  populat ions t h a t  expecta t ion  i s  
on t h e  o r d e r  of 25 o r  30 years ;  Sweden, with m o r t a l i t y  s t a t i s t i c s  
a v a i l a b l e  a s  e a r l y  a s  t h e  18th century ,  showed l e s s  than 35 years  
i n  i t s  f i r s t  l i f e  t a b l e s .  For t h e  world a s  a whole t h e  expecta- 
t i o n  has r i s e n  by 1950-1955 t o  47 years ,  then rap id ly  increased  
t o  58 yea r s  by 1975-1980 (United Nations 1981). 
Among t h e  many forms of s o c i a l  i n e q u a l i t y  i s  i n e q u a l i t y  be- 
f o r e  death.  United Nations f i g u r e s  show f o r  1975-1980 anexpecta-  
t i o n  of l i f e  a t  b i r t h  of 55 years  f o r  t h e  l e s s  developed regions,  
a g a i n s t  7 2  f o r  t h e  more developed regions  (United Nations 1981: 
82) .  Within c o u n t r i e s  t h e  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  by sex a r e  great-in 
t h e  developed regions males s tand  a t  about 68 years ,  females 
c l o s e  t o  76 years ,  a d i f f e r e n c e  of 8 yea r s  t h a t  c o n t r a s t s  with 
2 years  f o r  t h e  LDCs. The d i f f e r e n c e  f o r  developed coun t r i e s  
i s  about equal  t o  t h e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  between smokers and non- 
smokers, and s l i g h t l y  g r e a t e r  than t h a t  between blacks and Whites 
i n  t h e  United S t a t e s .  Though mor ta l i ty  by income wi th in  coun- 
t r i e s  is  harder  t o  measure than sex  and age d i f f e r e n c e s ,  we know 
something about it (see ,  f o r  example, Hauser and Kitagawa 1973, 
Sauvy 1957). We a l s o  know t h a t  some a t  l e a s t  of t h e  r ecen t  i m -  
provements i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  a r e  due t o  behavioral  changes, 
exe rc i se  and q u i t t i n g  smoking being t h e  two most important,  and 
these  may wel l  be c o r r e l a t e d  with s o c i a l  c l a s s .  
1.2. Mor ta l i ty  i n  Less Developed Countr ies  
Mor ta l i ty  improvement over  t h e  postwar per iod has been 
e s p e c i a l l y  g r e a t  i n  t h e  l e s s  developed coun t r i e s .  A s  a rough 
measure, t h e  mean length  of l i f e  has gone up on average of about 
one-half year  pe r  year  [13 yea r s  i n  25, according t o  UN (1981: 
82) es t imates]  a g a i n s t  a r i s e  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  s i n c e  t h e  be- 
ginning of t h e  century averaging only about  one-third of a year  
pe r  year ,  and s i n c e  1950 only about 4 years  i n  25. China's  
record i s  outs tanding ,  t o  judge from o f f i c i a l  f i g u r e s  repor ted  
by the  United Nations. For t h e  25 years  from 1950 t o  1975 t h e  
expecta t ion  of l i f e  rose  from 47 t o  68, a ga in  of 21 years ,  o r  
.8 of  a year  per  year .  This and o t h e r  ins t ances  of r ap id  in- 
c rease  i n  mean length  of l i f e  a r e  due l e s s  t o  t h e  in t roduc t ion  
of advanced medical techniques than t o  extens ion  of rudimentary 
hea l th  measures t o  s o c i a l  groups t h a t  had previously been a l -  
together  without  medical ca re ,  and most p a r t i c u l a r l y  t o  improved 
d i e t  and s a n i t a t i o n .  
Can mor ta l i ty  r a t e s  i n  t h e  developing world cont inue t o  i m -  
p r o v e a t t h e  pace of  t h e  l a s t  30 years? Atone-half year  increase  
i n  expecta t ion  of l i f e  a t  age zero f o r  each ca lendar  year  t h e  
developing c o u n t r i e s  would take  only t h r e e  decades t o  pass  t h e  
p o i n t  where t h e  advanced coun t r i e s  now s tand.  Desirable  a s  such 
an advance would be, t h e r e  i s  reason t o  doubt t h a t  it can happen. 
I n  f a c t  t h e r e  has  been a g e n t l e  f a l l  i n  t h e  ga ins  over re-  
c e n t  decades ( see  ~ w a t k i n  1980:615): t h e  l e s s  developed coun t r i e s  
a s  a whole inc reased  i n  expectancy by . 6 4  of a yea r  p e r  yea r  
dur ing  t h e  1950s, by .60 i n  t h e  1950s, by .52 i n  t h e  1960s, and 
by only .40 i n  t h e  1970s. One should no t  exaggerate  t h e  accur- 
acy of t h e s e  f i g u r e s ,  f o r  t h e r e  a r e  l a r g e  p a r t s  of t h e  world f o r  
which w e  do no t  know t h e  dea th  r a t e s ,  b u t  t h e  d e c e l e r a t i o n  seems 
t o  be a f a c t .  One can see t h i s  s t r i k i n g l y  i n  i n d i v i d u a l  coun- 
tr ies.  Egypt showed phenomenal g a i n s ,  up t o  .9 of a year  p e r  
yea r ,  dur ing  t h e  20 y e a r s  from about 1940 t o  1960, followed by 
much slower ga ins  s i n c e .  Most o f  Af r i ca  has  shown g a i n s  r a t h e r  
less t han  .5 of  a y e a r  pe r  yea r ,  wi th  slowing i n  r e c e n t  yea r s ;  
i n  p a r t s  o f  C e n t r a l  Af r i ca  it has even been s a i d  t h a t  t h e r e  has  
been an abso lu te  d e t e r i o r a t i o n .  Y e t  w e  cannot  be s u r e  of t h e s e  
a s s e r t i o n s ;  t h e  Afr ican  d a t a  a r e  p a r t i c u l a r l y  unce r t a in .  
Samuel Pres ton  has used econometric methods t o  a s c e r t a i n  
what propor t ion  of t h e  ga ins  i n  m o r t a l i t y  have been due t o  h e a l t h  
measures, a s  a g a i n s t  economic development. H e  f i n d s  t h a t  t h e  
c r e d i t  i s  about  equa l ly  d iv ided ,  wi th  h e a l t h  measures involv ing  
no i n c r e a s e  o f  income re spons ib le  f o r  about  h a l f  o f  t h e  ga ins .  
The l i s t  of such measures has  malar ia  c o n t r o l  a t  i t s  head, and 
inc ludes  t h e  provis ion  of p ro tec t ed  water  supp l i e s .  For example, 
malar ia  c o n t r o l  i s  c r e d i t e d  with  about  one-quarter o f  t h e  i m -  
provement i n  S r i  Lankan longevi ty .  The problems t h a t  remain 
a r e  d i a r r h e a ,  pneumonia, and m a l n u t r i t i o n ,  and t h e s e  cannot 
e a s i l y  be t ack led  wi th  r a i s i n g  l i v i n g  s tandards .  An acce lera-  
t i o n  i n  t h e  development process  could r e v e r s e  t h e  downtrend i n  
t h e  r a t e  of  improvement,but it would be over -opt imis t ic  t o  an- 
t i c i p a t e  such a c c e l e r a t i o n .  
The method used f o r  t h i s  paper does n o t  p r o j e c t  a c t u a l  mor- 
t a l i t y  d a t a ,  b u t  r a t h e r  moves a long  t h e  sequence of Coale and 
Demeny (1966) Model West t a b l e s .  That t h e s e  t a b l e s  a r e  a good 
f i t  t o  p a s t  sequences of m o r t a l i t y  improvement i n  most p a r t s  of  
t h e  world has  been e s t a b l i s h e d ,  though Noreen Goldman (1980) 
f i n d s  one except ion.  
1.3. F e r t i l i t y  
Many less developed c o u n t r i e s  r e p o r t  success  i n  t h e  spread 
o f  b i r t h  c o n t r o l .  C e r t a i n  smal l  c o u n t r i e s  around t h e  r i m  of  
Asia were t h e  f i r s t  t o  b r i n g  t h e i r  b i r t h  r a t e s  c l o s e  t o  those  
of t h e  advanced c o u n t r i e s ,  and Singapore i s  now w e l l  below re- 
placement. Some s o c i a l  groups throughout Asia  and L a t i n  America 
have lowered t h e i r  b i r t h s ,  and t h e  spread of b i r t h  c o n t r o l  has  
been widely r epor t ed  i n  Indonesia  and elsewhere.  Y e t  t h e  cen- 
suses  of 1980 have been d i sappo in t ing ,  showing f o r  Indonesia,  
f o r  i n s t ance ,  a popula t ion  about  5 m i l l i o n  g r e a t e r  t h a n  t h a t  
a n t i c i p a t e d  on t h e  b a s i s  of t h e  r e p o r t s  of  family planning ac- 
ceptances .  China has  promulgated a p o l i c y  of one- and two-child 
f a m i l i e s ,  and i f  i t s  people w i l l  go wi th  t h i s  p o l i c y  it w i l l  
very  soon f a l l  below replacement. I n  f a c t  t h e  f i g u r e  of some 
17  m i l l i o n  b i r t h s  f o r  1978 corresponds t o  less than  2 1/2 ch i ld -  
r e n  p e r  f e r t i l e  married couple ,  and s o  i s  j u s t  s l i g h t l y  above 
replacement. A t  t h e  o t h e r  extreme of family p lanning  success  
i s  Afr ica ,  where b i r t h s  show l i t t l e  s i g n  of  f a l l i n g  t o  conform 
w i t h  t h e  drop of t h e  d e a t h  r a t e .  
Urbanizat ion has  a complex r e l a t i o n  t o  f e r t i l i t y .  I n  
Europe and America du r ing  t h e  demographic t r a n s i t i o n  c i t ies  w e r e  
i n  t h e  van, w i th  b i r t h  r a t e s  a t  each s t a g e  lower than  r u r a l  
b i r t h  r a t e s .  This i s  less t r u e  of t h e  p r e s e n t  LDCs, many of  
whose c i t y  people  r e t a i n  t h e i r  r u r a l  c u l t u r e .  Y e t  t h e  migra t ion  
c o n t r i b u t e s  an i n d i r e c t  e f f e c t  t h a t  i s  impor tan t  i n  t h e  long  run.  
I f  coming t o  t h e  c i t y  does n o t  always o r  immediately change per- 
s o n a l i t i e s ,  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  of t h e  c i t y  a r e  such t h a t  urban resi- 
d e n t s  e x e r c i s e  p o l i t i c a l  c la ims  f a r  beyond any t h a t  peasants  can 
e x e r t .  Food and s h e l t e r  a r e  produced spontaneously i n  t h e  coun- 
t r y s i d e ,  w i thou t  any a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  o v e r s i g h t  o r  c o n t r i b u t i o n ;  
i n  t h e  c i t y  those  c i t i z e n s  who cannot  produce t h e i r  own can c a l l  
on government. Governments a r e  alarmed by t h e  expanding c i t ies ,  
f o r  whose we l fa re  they  a r e  asked t o  t ake  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  Popu- 
l a t i o n  growth i n  a peasant  count rys ide  i s  i n  a sense  hidden-it 
i s  known t o  t h e  census t a k e r s ,  b u t  does n o t  have immediate and 
p r e s s i n g  pub l i c  consequences. The burden of inc reased  popula- 
t i o n  f a l l s  on f a m i l i e s  i n  t h e  form of less p l e n t i f u l  food, a 
d e c l i n e  i n  d r a f t  animals ,  and sma l l e r  and sma l l e r  p l o t s  of  land.  
I t  does n o t  p l a c e  a s  d i r e c t  a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  on government a s  
does t h e  expansion of urban popula t ions .  
I n  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  have l a r g e  amounts of  empty l and ,  l e a d e r s  
have o f t e n  c a l l e d  on t h e i r  people  t o  se t t le  t h e  f r o n t i e r .  But 
such c o u n t r i e s  a l s o  have h igh  rates o f  u rban iza t ion ;  t h e  popula- 
t i o n  increment i s  more d i sposed  t o  come t o  t h e  c i t i e s ,  and 
e s p e c i a l l y  t o  t h e  l a r g e s t  c i t i e s , t h a n  t o  heed n a t i o n a l i s t i c  ap- 
p e a l s .  There w a s  much t a l k  o f  f i l l i n g  empty l a n d s  by ambit ious  
governments i n  t h e  1960s; by t h e  1970s t h e  cont inued  flow t o  t h e  
c i t i e s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e  i n  Mexico, w a s  a major f a c t o r  i n  t u r n i n g  
t h e  thoughts  o f  governments i n  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  of  f ami ly  planning.  
How do  such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  t r a n s l a t e  i n t o  numbers expected 
i n  t h e  f u t u r e ?  For  most of t h e  c o u n t r i e s  of  A s i a  and   at in 
America t hey  t e l l  us  t h a t  t h e  drop  o f  c h i l d b e a r i n g  t o  r ep l ace -  
ment, say  2.3 c h i l d r e n  p e r  f e r t i l e  marr ied couple  on t h e  average ,  
w i l l  come b e f o r e  t h e  t u r n  of t h e  cen tu ry ;  f o r  A f r i c a  it w i l l  
a p p a r e n t l y  be  l a t e r  t han  t h a t .  However, w e  do n o t  e s t i m a t e  re -  
placement much l a t e r ,  f o r  A f r i c a  s t a n d s  under  t h e  danger  o f  
d i s e a s e  and hunger,  a s  t h e  c u r r e n t  news r e p o r t s  t e l l  u s  cons tan t -  
l y ,  and it i s  i n  real  danger o f  a rise i n  i t s  d e a t h  rate. Our 
judgement i s  t h a t  replacement  w i l l  be  a t t a i n e d  i n  most o f  t h e  
less developed c o u n t r i e s  by 2000-2005 a t  t h e  l a t e s t ,  and by 10 
y e a r s  a f t e r  t h a t  i n  Af r i ca .  
1.4. Taking Account o f  Rural  and Urban 
The techniques  used i n  t h i s  set  o f  p r o j e c t i o n s  do n o t  de- 
compose n a t i o n a l  popu la t ions  i n t o  subgroups beyond age and sex.  
Y e t  w e  know t h a t  i n  f a c t  subgroups evolve d i f f e r e n t l y ,  and w e  
a l s o  know t h a t  whatever t h e  technique  of  p r o j e c t i o n ,  when it i s  
a p p l i e d  s e p a r a t e l y  t o  subgroups and t h e  r e s u l t s  added it comes 
o u t  d i f f e r e n t  from t h e  s imple  p r o j e c t i o n  of t h e  undivided whole. 
I t  can be  shown mathemat ica l ly  t h a t  if subgroups are pro- 
j e c t e d  s e p a r a t e l y  on geometr ic  i n c r e a s e ,  and t h e  r e s u l t s  added, 
t h a t  a d d i t i v e  t o t a l  w i l l  be  g r e a t e r  t han  t h e  s imple  t o t a l  ob- 
t a i n e d  by p r o j e c t i n g  t h e  whole a t  a  ra te  of  i n c r e a s e  equa l  t o  
t h e  weighted average  of t h e  i n i t i a l  r a t e s  o f  i n c r e a s e  of t h e  
subgroups (Keyf i t z  1977:14-18). The reason  i s  t h a t  t h o s e  of 
t h e  subgroups t h a t  are i n c r e a s i n g  f a s t e r  w i l l  come t o  have more 
weight i n  t h e  a d d i t i v e  ve r s ion  a s  time goes along, while  i n  t h e  
simple ve r s ion  they i m p l i c i t l y  r e t a i n  t h e i r  i n i t i a l  weight. 
But t h i s  genera l  e f f e c t ,  which f o r  short-t ime i n t e r v a l s  and 
moderate d i f f e r e n t i a l  r a t e  of increase  is  small ,  i s  overwhelmed 
by a  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  e f f e c t  i n  t h e  case of a  decomposition i n t o  
r u r a l  and urban p a r t s .  I n  most p laces  and t imes t h e  urban b i r t h  
r a t e  i s  lower than  t h e  r u r a l ,  and i f  one al lows f o r  t h e  s h i f t  of 
populat ion from r u r a l  t o  urban, a s  it i s  t ak ing  p lace  i n  t h e  l e s s  
developed c o u n t r i e s  of t h e  world today, t h e  p r o j e c t i o n  t o  f u t u r e  
t imes would on t h i s  account come o u t  lower. Work i s  now underway 
a t  I I A S A  t o  improve t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n  by a  mul t i r eg iona l  approach 
wi th in  each country.  
1.5. I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Migration 
With t h e  f i l l i n g  up of t h e  Americas before  t h e  middle o f  t h e  
twent ie th  c e n t u r y t h e l a s t  g r e a t  movement ac ross  t h e  A t l a n t i c  from 
Europe was over ,  a n d l a r g e  s c a l e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  migrat ion seemed t o  
be a  th ing  of t h e  p a s t .  That proved n o t  t o  be so. Refugees from 
Cuba and Vietnam t o  t h e  United S t a t e s ,  gues t  workers from southern 
Europe and western Asia t o  nor thern  Europe, who s e t t l e d  down a s  
r e s i d e n t s ,  l e g a l  and i l l e g a l ,  movement from Bangladesh t o  northern 
Ind ia ,  and ac ross  t h e  US-Mexico border ,  movement from ex-colonies 
t o  ex-metropolises, f l i g h t  from drought and war i n  Africa-these 
a r e  some of t h e  migrat ion c u r r e n t s  s i n c e  World War 11, with a  
t o t a l  volume unprecedented i n  world h i s t o r y .  
The s i x  m i l l i o n  gues t  workers i n  nor thern  Europe, t h e  refu-  
gees and i l l e g a l s  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s ,  can s t i l l  be thought of 
a s  a  cont inuat ion  of t h e  stream of migrat ion t h a t  brought some 
60 mi l l ion  workers t o  t h e  New World during t h e  century o r  s o  p r i o r  
t o  World War 11. That t r a d i t i o n a l  stream cons is ted  of Europeans 
of lower l e v e l s  of  educat ion,  wi th  minimum property,  s k i l l ,  o r  
o t h e r  a t t r i b u t e  t h a t  could g ive  them a  s a t i s f a c t o r y  p lace  i n  t h e  
European economy. They were welcomed t o  t h e  New World a s  they 
helped put  i t s  r i c h  lands  t o  p r o f i t a b l e  use and c o n s t i t u t e d  t h e  
l abor  fo rce  of i t s  i n c i p i e n t  indus t ry .  During t h e  65 years  from 
t h e  C i v i l  War t o  1930,they brought t h e  western p l a i n s  of North 
America under c u l t i v a t i o n ,  labored i n  c l o t h i n g  f a c t o r i e s  i n  New 
York, wh i l e  o t h e r  branches of  t h e  same s t ream o f  migran ts  con- 
t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  product ion  of  meat and wheat on t h e  Argent ine  
pampas, and b u i l t  p l a n t a t i o n s  i n  t h e  f o r e s t s  o f  B r a z i l .  
The mig ra t ion  of t h e  postwar pe r iod ,  and presumably t h a t  o f  
t h e  50 y e a r s  ahead of  u s ,  i s  a response,  less warmly welcomed by 
t h e  c i t i z e n s  of t h e  r e c e i v i n g  c o u n t r i e s ,  t o  t h e  inc reased  d i f f e r -  
ences o f  income between t h e  poor and t h e  r i c h  c o u n t r i e s .  Migra- 
t i o n  has  always been up t h e  income g r a d i e n t ,  b u t  p a s t  g r a d i e n t s  
w e r e  less s t e e p ,  t h e  p r e s s u r e  t o  move less i n t e n s e ,  and hence 
t h e  flow could be more r e a d i l y  c o n t r o l l e d  by t h e  r e c e i v i n g  coun- 
tries. Now re fugees  appear  who a r e  n o t  e a s i l y  tu rned  down; 
f o r e i g n e r s  i n  Swi tzer land  become numerous enough t o  d i s t u r b  i t s  
c u l t u r a l  homogeneity; P a k i s t a n i s  and Jamaicans, t h e  h e r i t a g e  of 
a  d i s s o l v e d  empire, a r e  involved i n  r a c e  r i o t s  i n  England. Refu- 
gees  from c u r r e n t  wars and from p o l i t i c a l  h o s t i l i t y  a r e  p a r t i c u -  
l a r l y  numerous i n  A f r i c a ,  bu t  f a r  from unknown i n  Asia  and L a t i n  
America. 
Counting i l l e g a l s ,  immigration i n t o  t h e  United S t a t e s  i s  
thought  t o  be  l a r g e r  t h a n  t h e  m i l l i o n  p l u s  who e n t e r e d  i n  1913, 
t h e  h i g h e s t  y e a r  i n  t h e  o f f i c i a l  record .  No one knows how many 
i l l e g a l s  come i n ,  and no one even has  any very  good sugges t ion  
f o r  f i n d i n g  o u t .  A s  long a s  Mexico con t inues  t o  be  poor,  people 
w i l l  somehow c r o s s  t h e  Rio Grande. They could of course  be ex- 
c luded by something approaching a  m i l i t a r y  defense  of t h e  f ron-  
t ier ,  b u t  t h a t  would s e r i o u s l y  harm t h e  d ip loma t i c  and commercial 
a s s o c i a t i o n  of t h e  United S t a t e s  and Mexico. 
I n  a d d i t i o n  t h e r e - a r e g e n u i n e  a d v a n t a g e s i n  i l l e g a l  immigration 
t o  some s e g m e n t s o f u n i t e d  S t a t e s  a g r i c u l t u r e a n d i n d u s t r y -  The il- 
l e g a l s  h a v e n o c l a i m t o  s o c i a l  b e n e f i t s  o r  l e g a l  p r o t e c t i o n i f o r  some 
i n d u s t r i e s  t hey  make an i d e a l  l a b o r  fo rce .  They supply a  l a b o r  mar- 
k e t  f r e e r  t han  any t h a t h a s  e x i s t e d  s i n c e t h e  e a r l y  d a y s o f t h e  indus- 
t r i a l  r evo lu t ion .  The domestic o b j e c t i o n  t o  c o n t r o l  a t  t h e  p o i n t  
o f  employment is s t r o n g ,  p a r t l y  because o f t h e l s e l f - i n t e r e s t  of  em- 
p loye r s ,  and p a r t l y  because of t h e  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  no employee ought 
t o  have bo i d e n t i f y  himself  a n d t h e  l e g a l i t y  of  h i s  r e s idence  when 
apply ing  f o r  a  job,  say a s  a  l e t t u c e  p i cke r .  I t i s  s a f e  t o  f o r e c a s t  
t h a t  t h e r e  w i l l  be no immediate o r  easy  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  immigra- 
t i o n  problem. The o p t i o n s  have r e c e n t l y  been set  f o r t h  by P h i l i p  
Mart in  (1981).  
Our f o r e c a s t s ,  based on a uniform method, t a k e  no account  of 
migrat ion.  P r e s e n t  l a r g e  and spo rad ic  movements h a r d l y  lend them- 
s e l v e s  t o  e x t r a p o l a t i o n .  Our omission u n d e r s t a t e s  t h e  United 
S t a t e s  populat ion.  Pu t  somewhat d i f f e r e n t l y ,  o u r  method i s  equiv- 
a l e n t  t o  supposing t h a t  t h e r e  w i l l  be s t a t i o n a r i t y  ove r  t h e  long 
t e r m ,  count ing b i r t h s ,  d e a t h s ,  and migrat ion.  Any degree  i n  which 
b i r t h  e s t i m a t e s  a r e  h igh ,  a s  they  w e l l  may be, would o f f s e t  t h e  
l a c k  of p rov i s ion  f o r  migrat ion.  The e s t i m a t e  t h a t  w e  a r e  us ing ,  
248 m i l l i o n  i n  t h e  US i n  2000, compares w i t h  t h e  medium e s t i m a t e  
o f  t h e  ' un i t ed  S t a t e s  Bureau of t h e  Census of 260 m i l l i o n  and of 
t h e  United Nations of  264 m i l l i o n .  
A p a r t  of t h e  problem everywhere i s  t h e  popu la t ion  l e v e l  f o r  
. the  jumping-off p o i n t .  The US Census of 1980 counted about  5 
m i l l i o n  people more than  it would have counted wi th  t h e  degree o f  
incompleteness of 1970. The l e v e l  f o r  t h e  y e a r  2000 i s  much a f -  
f e c t e d  by whether t h e  1980 popula t ion  i s  r e a l l y  222 m i l l i o n ,  a s  
s t a t e d  be fo re  t h e  census ,  o r  227 m i l l i o n  a s  counted,  o r  over  230 
m i l l i o n  a s  it could w e l l  be i f  one adds uncounted i l l e g a l s .  Our 
f o r e c a s t  e x t r a p o l a t e s  t h e  pre-1980 census  f i g u r e .  
S t a r t i n g  w i t h  227 m i l l i o n  and adding migra t ion  of  500,000 
p e r  yea r ,  which t o  judge from r e c e n t  s t a t i s t i c s  i s  t h e  l e a s t  t h a t  
should be al lowed, would b r i n g  us  t o  15 m i l l i o n  ( p l u s  any n a t u r a l  
i n c r e a s e  of t h e s e )  by t h e  end of  t h e  cen tury  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  
248 m i l l i o n  t h a t  i s  shown i n  our  t a b l e .  The t o t a l  248 + 15 = 163 
i s  about  t h e  middle of  t h e  s e v e r a l  o t h e r  e s t ima tes .  The United 
S t a t e s  and China a r e  t h e  two main c o u n t r i e s  f o r  which t i m e  t o  re- 
placement does n o t  p rovide  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  s c a l e .  
2. POPULATION FORECASTS: ASSUMPTIONS AND ACCURACY 
The h i s t o r y  of  popula t ion  f o r e c a s t i n g  i s  more f avorab le  than  
t h a t  of t echno log ica l  o r  economic, l e t  a lone  geo log ica l ,  f o r e c a s t -  
i ng ,  bu t  it i s  s t i l l  n o t  good. No one knows what t h e  popula t ion  
w i l l  be 50 yea r s  hence, and t h e  h i s t o r y  of popula t ion  f o r e c a s t i n g  
is  now long enough t h a t  w e  can  e s t i m a t e  t h e  range of ignorance.  
The exper ience  i s  h e r e  summarized b r i e f l y ,  i n  such a  form t h a t  
t h e  r eade r  can  know w i t h i n  what l i m i t s  t h e  p r e s e n t  work i s . t o  
be  t r u s t e d .  Aside from be ing  presen ted  a long  wi th  an e r r o r  
s t a t emen t ,  t h e  p r e s e n t  work has whatever advantage t h e r e  i s  i n  
a  uniform procedure a p p l i e d  t o  a l l  c o u n t r i e s .  Th i rd ly ,  it in -  
volves  a  comparison wi th  some f i v e  o t h e r  f o r e c a s t s ,  made by t h e  
United Nations,  t h e  World Bank, and o t h e r  agenc ies ,  and a s  f a r  
a s  p o s s i b l e  w e  fo rced  cons is tency  wi th  those  o t h e r  e s t ima tes .  
These t h r e e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s - a  s t a t e d  confidence i n t e r v a l ,  a  
s imple  and uniform method, and comparison w i t h  t h e  main fore-  
c a s t s  e x t a n t  and i n  t h e  p u b l i c  domain-are t h e  s p e c i a l  charac- 
terist ics of t h e  numbers f o r  t h e  y e a r s  1980-2030 given i n  t h i s  
paper.  
S t a t e d  i n  one sen tence ,  t h e  assumptions are t h a t  b i r t h  r a t e s  
w i l l  d e c l i n e  t o  t h e  p o i n t  of ba re  replacement of t h e  popula t ion  
abou t  t h e  end of t h e  cen tu ry ,  and t h a t  d e a t h  r a t e s  w i l l  con t inue  
t o  d e c l i n e  f o r  a l l  c o u n t r i e s  and d u r i n g  t h e  nex t  50 yea r s  t hey  
w i l l  r each  a  l e v e l  somewhat below t h a t  of t h e  p r e s e n t l y  developed 
c o u n t r i e s .  
B i r t h s  a r e  expressed i n  terms of t h e  t o t a l  f e r t i l i t y  r a t e :  
t h e  number of c h i l d r e n  t h a t  a  g i r l  c h i l d  can  be expected t o  have. 
The s o l e  v a r i a b l e  parameter o f  ou r  method i s  t h e  t i m e  t o  ba re  
replacement,  which i s  t o  say  t o  when each g i r l  c h i l d  w i l l  be ex- 
pected t o  bea r  one g i r l  c h i l d  on t h e  m o r t a l i t y  regime t h e n  pre- 
v a i l i n g .  Sub jec t  t o  t h i s ,  f e r t i l i t y  was taken  a s  f a l l i n g  i n  a  
s t r a i g h t  l i n e  from t h e  l e v e l  o f  1980 t o  t h e  d a t e  when b a r e  re- 
placement was assumed. 
That t h e  t i m e  t o  ba re  replacement i s  a  convenient  parameter 
was shown by F re jka  (1973) .  Our own c a l c u l a t i , o n  shows t h a t  each 
f i v e  year  de lay  i n  t h e  a t t a inmen t  of replacement adds about  700 
m i l l i o n  t o  t h e  world popula t ion .  I f  one t a k e s  it t h a t  rep lace-  
ment w i l l  be a t t a i n e d  i n  t h e  y e a r s  2000-2005 t h e n  t h e  u l t i m a t e  
world popula t ion  comes o u t  t o  be  9  b i l l i o n .  
S t a t i s t i c s  of b i r t h s  by age of  mother a r e  n o t  t o  be  had f o r  
most c o u n t r i e s ,  and w e  had only  t h e  n e t  reproduct ion  r a t e  esti-  
mated by t h e  United Nations t o  t e l l  u s  t h e  l e v e l .  W e  used t h i s  
a long  w i t h  t h e  model f e r t i l i t y  t a b l e s  due t o  Coale and T r u s s e l  
(1974: 185-258) . 
We allowed some complication i n  t h e  way t h a t  m o r t a l i t y  f a l l s .  
With t h e  age s p e c i f i c  dea th  r a t e  f o r  1975 a s  t h e  s t a r t  we took it 
t h a t  t h e  m o r t a l i t y  f a l l  would depend on age, on how m o r t a l i t y  f o r  
a l l  ages toge the r  s t ands  i n  1975, and on t h e  t ime when t h e  change 
is t ak ing  place.  Thus t h e  o l d e r  ages a r e  assumed t o  f a l l  more 
slowly than t h e  younger; t h e  h igher  t h e  expecta t ion  of  l i f e  t h e  
slower t h e  f a l l ;  t h e  l a t e r  i n  t i m e  t h e  slower t h e  f a l l  ( ~ i t t m a n  
and Keyfitz 1977) . 
A l l  of our  p r o j e c t i o n s  were c a r r i e d  o u t  country by country 
and t h e  t o t a l s  f o r  t h e  s e v e r a l  groups of coun t r i e s  obtained by 
add i t ion .  There a r e  two advantages, both small  b u t  a v a i l a b l e  a t  
no c o s t ,  i n  p r o j e c t i n g  f o r  ind iv idua l  c o u n t r i e s  and then adding. 
-- 
The a d d i t i v e  t o t a l ,  a s  pointed o u t  above, i s  l a r g e r  than  t h e  u n i t  
t o t a l  obtained f o r  t h e  group a s  a  whole, and w e  t h ink  t h a t  i f  
t h e r e  i s  any choice it i s  more prec ise .  Thus f o r  t h e  world a s  a  
whole with replacement i n  2000-2005 t h e  a d d i t i v e  t o t a l  f o r  2030 
i s  8,093 mi l l ion ,  and t h e  u n i t  t o t a l  i s  300 m i l l i o n  l e s s .  The 
d i f f e r e n c e  i s  small  i n - r e l a t i o n  t o  e r r o r , b u t  w e  have t h e  conven- 
i ence  t h a t  a l l  of t h e  breakdowns a r e  c o n s i s t e n t  with one another;  
when we add t h e  con t inen t s  w e  g e t  t h e  same r e s u l t  a s  when we add 
t h e  l e s s  and more developed coun t r i e s .  
We a r e  indebted t o  t h e  United Nations Populat ions Division 
f o r  t h e  b a s i c  d a t a  on which t h e s e  c a l c u l a t i o n s  a r e  made. I n  par- 
t i c u l a r  t h e  Divis ion was kind enough t o  provide u s  wi th  t h e  age 
d i s t r i b u t i o n s ,  t h e  n e t  reproduct ion r a t e s ,  and t h e  expecta t ions  
of  l i f e  f o r  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  of  over  250,000 populat ion t h a t  they 
and we recognize i n  advance of  t h e i r  own publ ica t ion .  
Our a d j u s t a b l e  parameter, t h e  time t o  replacement, is  no 
e a s i e r  f o r  us t o  know than f o r  anyone e l s e .  W e  have examined t h e  
p ro jec t ions  t o  t h e  year  2000 made by a  number of agencies ,  and 
how these  f a l l  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  s e v e r a l  t imes t o  replacement. 
Thus i n  t h e  case  of Egypt, replacement by 2000-2005 - --- woula g ive  
a  2000 populat ion of 61.3 mi l l ion ,  andby2015-2020,15years l a t e r ,  
. . . - -- - 
would g ive  65.8 m i l l i o n  f o r  t h e  year  2000. The ~ n - i t s  ~ a t i b n s ,  
t h e  World Bank, and t h e  United S t a t e s  Bureau of t h e  Census a l l  
gave populat ions f o r  t h e  year  2000 t h a t  a r e  between t h e s e  numbers 
while  Donald Bogue (1979) and Littman and ~ e y f i t z  (1977) f a l l  
somewhat below t h i s  range. 
2.1. Check Against  Other Fo recas t s  
There e x i s t  now a t  l e a s t  f i v e  p r o j e c t i o n s  of  popula t ion  f o r  
t h e  c o u n t r i e s  of t h e  world by t h e  United Nations,  t h e  Populat ion 
Reference Bureau, t h e  World Bank, t h e  US Bureau of  t h e  Census, 
and t h e  Community and Family Study Center  of t h e  Un ive r s i ty  of  
Chicago. Most of them go only  t o  t h e  yea r  2000, and t h a t  o f  t h e  
Bureau of t h e  Census covers  on ly  t h e  l a r g e s t  c o u n t r i e s .  They a r e  
f a r  from independent of  one another ,  a s  i s  shown i n  t h e i r  docu- 
mentat ion and i n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e i r  r e s u l t s  ag ree  c l o s e l y .  But 
each of them c o n t r i b u t e s  some elements of judgement by competent 
demographers, and w e  made use  of a l l  of  them i n  determining ou r  
own f o r e c a s t .  
For each o f  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  w e  p r o j e c t e d  wi th  t imes  t o  rep lace-  
ment from 1990-1995 u p t o  2020-2025. Wethen examined t h e  f i g u r e s  
f o r  t h e  yea r  2000 incompar i son  wi th  t h e  f i v e  o u t s i d e  f o r e c a s t s .  W e  
chose a t i m e  t o  replacement t h a t  gave us  a f i g u r e  f o r  2000 about  
t h e  c e n t e r  o f  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  t h e  o u t s i d e  f o r e c a s t s .  A few 
i n s t a n c e s  w i l l  show t h e  combination o f  c a l c u l a t i o n  and judgement. 
2.2. The La rges t  Count r ies  
I n  t h e  c a s e  of  N ige r i a  t h e  lowest  o f  t h e  f i v e  e s t i m a t e s  f o r  
t h e  yea r  2000 was 121.6 m i l l i o n ,  by t h e  Community and Family Study 
Center  of t h e  Un ive r s i ty  of  Chicago. The h i g h e s t  was t h a t  o f  t h e  
World Bank, w i th  157.1 m i l l i o n .  Between w e r e  t h e  o t h e r  t h r e e  
sources .  W e  noted t h a t  t h e  u l t i m a t e  s t a t i o n a r y  popula t ion  fore-  
c a s t  by t h e  World Bank was 435 m i l l i o n ,  and though t h i s  was a 
reasonable  e x t r a p o l a t i o n  from p a s t  growth, it seemed t o o  high on 
e c o l o g i c a l  grounds. One can  ha rd ly  imagine Niger ia  be ing  a b l e  t o  
feed  such a popula t ion ,  o r  se l l  t h e  manufactured goods t h a t  would 
buy food f o r  them. W e  p u t  N i g e r i a ' s  t ime t o  replacement a t  2015- 
2020 and t h i s  g i v e s  it 134 m i l l i o n  f o r  t h e  yea r  2000. That i s  
almost  e x a c t l y  what t h e  United S t a t e s  Census Bureau gave, b u t  is  
cons iderab ly  below t h r e e  o t h e r  e s t ima tes .  
China ' s  p o l i c y  has  gone through v a r i o u s  phases,  s t a r t i n g  i n  
t h e  1950s wi th  o f f i c i a l  oppos i t i on  t o  any b i r t h  c o n t r o l  n o t  i m -  
mediate ly  i n  a i d  of t h e  h e a l t h  o f  mother and c h i l d ,  and evolving 
t o  t h e  u l t i m a t e  ve ry  f u l l  r e c o g n i t i o n  of  t h e  popula t ion  problem 
i n  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  of  1978. Any ideo log ica l  oppos i t ion  t o  b i r t h  
c o n t r o l  has  given way t o  p r a c t i c a l  necess i ty  i n  t h e  f ace  of  econ- 
omic handicap of a f a s t  mult iplying population. The regime i n  
Bei j ing i s  determined and e f f e c t i v e ;  it has gone t o  enormous pa ins  
t o  persuade couples t o  have no more than one c h i l d ,  a t  most two. 
Trave l l e r s  r e p o r t  success  i n  t h e  a reas  t h a t  they v i s i t e d ,  though 
they have n o t  been a b l e  t o  v i s i t  a random sample of v i l l a g e s .  
Most o f  t h e  s e r i e s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  us p o i n t  t o  a Chinese popu- 
l a t i o n  of 1,200 m i l l i o n  o r  l e s s  by t h e  e n d o f t h e  century.  To as-  
s i g n  it replacement by t h e  yea r  1990-1995 shows 1,361 m i l l i o n  by 
2000, which i s  ev iden t ly  high. Even i f  replacement i s  s e t  a t  
1980, i . e . ,  immediately, t h e  2000 populat ion would be 1,268 m i l -  
l i o n ,  which i s  higher  than  any of t h e  e s t ima tes  except  t h a t  of 
t h e  Bureau of t h e  Census and reaches 1,453 m i l l i o n  by 2030 and 
1,617 m i l l i o n  by 2075. Unless China i s  below replacement f o r  a 
cons iderable  per iod of time, it w i l l  have an u l t ima te  populat ion 
g r e a t e r  than 3.6 b i l l i o n .  
When government makes population t h e  s u b j e c t  of a c t i v e - p o l i c y ,  
it places  s p e c i a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s i n t h e w a y o f  one who would produce 
uncondit ional  f o r e c a s t s .  Any f o r e c a s t  then  becomes a judgement 
on t h e  f e a s i b i l i t y  and on t h e  success  of t h e  government's pol icy .  
Aside from t h e  usual  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  t h e  f o r e c a s t e r  has  t o  say by 
impl ica t ion  whether what t h e  government i s  doing can succeed- 
whether among o t h e r  t h i n g s  t h a t  government w i l l  s t a y  i n  power, 
and whether it w i l l  be a b l e  t o  p e r s i s t  i n  i t s  pol icy  i f  it does. 
The populat ion f o r e c a s t e r  can hardly shoulder  such a burden of 
judgement, given t h a t  whatever s k i l l  he has  l i e s  i n  t h e  capaci ty  
t o  e x t r a p o l a t e  p a s t  f i g u r e s  o f  b i r t h s ,  dea ths ,  and migration. 
I n  t h e  f ace  of a l l  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  and e s p e c i a l l y  of t h e  
r ap id  changes t h a t  China has seen i n  many f i e l d s  inc luding  t h e  
disseminat ion of b i r t h  c o n t r o l ,  t h e  b e s t  t h a t  we can do i s  t o  
t ake  it t h a t  t h e  number of b i r t h s  w i l l  n o t  r i s e  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  i n  
t h e  f u t u r e  from where it now is. From an a l l - t ime  high po in t  of 
29 m i l l i o n  i n  1963 t h e r e  has been an i r r e g u l a r  d e c l i n e  t h a t  
brought t h e  l e v e l  t o  17  m i l l i o n  i n  t h e  l a t e  1970s. We do n o t  
th ink  t h a t  it w i l l  be allowed t o  rise s u b s t a n t i a l l y  above t h i s ,  
even though f a m i l i e s  of considerably l e s s  than two c h i l d r e n  w i l l  
be requi red  t o  prevent  a r i s e ,  given t h e  very young age d i s t r i -  
but ion.  I f  t h e  h ighes t  t h a t  t h e  b i r t h s  a r e  allowed t o  average 
during t h e  next  50 yea r s  i s  20 m i l l i o n ,  then  we can say t h a t  t h e  
populat ion w i l l  be below t h e  surv ivors  of t h e  one b i l l i o n  b i r t h s  
p lus  t h e  p resen t  populat ion of one b i l l i o n  by t h e  year  2030. 
Using a l i f e  t a b l e  of 70-years expecta t ion  derived from Coale 
and Demeny (1966) we f i n d  f o r  t h e  year  2030 a populat ion of 1,423 
mi l l ions .  For t h e  t u r n  of t h e  century w e  f i n d  1,223 mi l l ion .  
This l a t t e r  i s  s t r add led  by 1,329 m i l l i o n  of t h e  United S t a t e s  
Bureau of t h e  Census, and by 1,190 of t h e  United Nations. China 
i s  t h e  one country f o r  which w e  have been compelled t o  depar t  
from our  uniform method. I f  t h i s  i s  i n  e r r o r  it i s  on t h e  high 
s i d e ,  t o  judge from t h e  very convincing s ta tements  of  t h e  author- 
i t ies .  
Forecas ts  f o r  India  a r e  about t h e  b i l l i o n  mark f o r  2000, 
with t h r e e  below t h e  b i l l i o n  and two above. Assuming replacement 
by 2000-2005 br ings  one.- to  1,020 m i l l i o n  by 2000, which i s  what 
w e  a r e  using. 
The USSR p r e s e n t s  a p a r t i c u l a r l y  simple case ,  with a l l  f i v e  
of t h e  agencies  i n  t h e  narrow range from 306 m i l l i o n  t o  312 m i l -  
l i o n .  Our own comes o u t  t o  310 mi l l ion .  
The United S t a t e s  i s  assumed t o  have f e r t i l i t y  gen t ly  s lop-  
ing  upwards towards replacement, and on our  e s t ima te  comes o u t  
t o  248 m i l l i o n  by 2000. But t h i s  i s  using  t h e  pre-census f i g u r e  
of 222  m i l l i o n  f o r  1980. Our work t akes  no account o f  immigra- 
t i o n .  I t  i s  s a f e  t o  guess  t h a t  f u t u r e  numbers w i l l  be 10, per- 
haps 15, m i l l i o n  h igher  than our  es t imate .  
Indonesia i s  t h e  s u b j e c t  of much d isaggregat ion  on t h e  p a r t  
of t h e  s e v e r a l  agencies ,  which run a s  low a s  194 m i l l i o n ,  and a s  
high a s  222  mil l ion .  O u r  method, with replacement by 2000-2305, 
g ives  222  m i l l i o n  f o r  Indonesia i n  t h e  year  2000. This pu t s  us  
a t  t h e  high end of  t h e  range, which seems j u s t i f i e d  by t h e  1981 
Census. 
On Japan t h e  range o f  agencies  was from 129 t o  133, almost 
a s  narrow a s  t h a t  f o r  t h e  USSR. Our method ended up i n  t h e  mid- 
d l e ,  with 131 mi l l ion .  Japan has been except ional  throughout 
i t s  h i s t o r y ,  and t h i s  agreement should n o t  e x c i t e  over-confidence 
i n  t h e  common f o r e c a s t .  Apparently Tokugawa Japan (1603-1867) 
showed crude b i r t h  r a t e s  i n  t h e  range 15 t o  30 p e r  thousand. 
This  was followed by r i s i n g  r a t e s  up t o  1919, f a l l i n g  r a t e s  t o  
1920-1935, and from 1950 a r a p i d  f a l l  i n  bo th  f e r t i l i t y  and mor- 
t a l i t y  (see, Mosk 1979:19). The h i s t o r i c a l  excep t ions  of Japan 
and France,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  v a r i a t i o n  w i t h i n t h e  c o u n t r i e s  of Europe 
shown by t h e  P r ince ton  s tudy ,  undermine t r u s t  i n  t h e  demographic 
t r a n s i t i o n  a s  a f o r e c a s t i n g  ins t rument . .  
2.3. Accuracy of F o r e c a s t s  
A f o r e c a s t e r  must r e s p e c t  t h e  unknown f o r c e s  t h a t  determine 
t h e  f u t u r e  and be modest concerning h i s  own powers t o  p e n e t r a t e  
t o  t hese .  Such modesty i s  t augh t  by p a s t  exper ience.  E a r l i e r  
f o r e c a s t s  can i n d i c a t e  t h e  bounds t h a t  should be set  on p r e s e n t  
ones ,  and t h e  bounds t u r n  o u t  t o  be wide. One method f o r  a s ses s -  
i n g  e r r o r  i s  desc r ibed  elsewhere (Keyf i tz  1981) and a b r i e f  sum- 
mary w i l l  s u f f i c e  f o r  t h e  p r e s e n t  purpose. 
The measure o f  accuracy used is t h e  degree  t o  which t h e  
f o r e c a s t  impl ied annual  r a t e  of  i n c r e a s e  exceeds t h e  r e a l i z e d  
r a t e  o f  i n c r e a s e .  For example, Whelpton i n  1936 f o r e c a s t  t h e  
popula t ion  of t h e  y e a r  1970 a t  155 m i l l i o n .  I n  1936 t h e  United 
S t a t e s  popula t ion  w a s  127 m i l l i o n ,  s o  t h a t  t h e  r a t e  of  i n c r e a s e  
impl ied was 0.57 pe rcen t .  Ac tua l ly  t h e  popula t ion  grew t o  203 
m i l l i o n ,  so  t h a t  t h e  r e a l i z e d  r a t e  of  i n c r e a s e  was 1.35 percent .  
That  makes ou r  measure of  t h e  inaccuracy of  t h e  f o r e c a s t  t h e  d i f -  
f e r e n c e  between t h e s e  two numbers, i .e. ,  1.35 - 0.57 = 0.78 per-  
centage p o i n t s .  Such d i f f e r e n c e s  can be averaged i n  many ways, 
of  which two t h a t  come t o  mind a r e  t h e  root-mean-square and t h e  
mean a b s o l u t e  va lue .  A round number t h a t  roughly d e s c r i b e s  t h e  
r eco rd  o f  some 1,100 f o r e c a s t s  i s  0.3 percentage  p o i n t s  i n  t h e  
mean a b s o l u t e  e r r o r .  Again speaking roughly,  t h i s  t e l l s  u s  t h a t  
one could  s a f e l y  b e t  even odds t h a t t h e r e a l i z e d  r a t e  of i n c r e a s e  
w i l l  t u r n  o u t  t o  be w i t h i n  0.3 percentage p o i n t s  of t h e  f o r e c a s t  
r a t e  of i nc rease .  
I n  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  ou r  own f o r e c a s t  f o r  t h e  Republic of Korea 
i n  t h e  y e a r  2000, w e  say  t h a t  t h e  popula t ion  w i l l  be 51.8 m i l l i o n  
a g a i n s t  a 1980 populat ion of 39.1 mi l l ion ,  i . e . ,  a r a t e  of 
inc rease  of 1.42 percent  per  year .  Adding and s u b t r a c t i n g  0.3 
percentage p o i n t s  t o  t h i s  we can b e t  even odds t h a t  t h e  r e a l i z e d  
r a t e  of inc rease  w i l l  be between 1.12 and 1.72 percent  per year ,  
which would g ive  f o r  t h e  year  2000 a range i n  t h e  number of 
people from 48.8 t o  54.9 mi l l ion .  For 2030 t h e  l i m i t s  would be 
55.9 , t o  75.2 mi l l ion .  This range may seem wide, y e t  it i s  based 
on t h e  average of t h e  e r r o r s  of populat ion f o r e c a s t s  f o r  t h e  
s e v e r a l  coun t r i e s  of  t h e  world. 
Two cons ide ra t ions  permit  some narrowing of  t h i s  e s t ima te  
of e r r o r .  One i s  t h a t  r ecen t  f o r e c a s t s  have been more p r e c i s e  
than those  made e a r l i e r .  The o t h e r  i s  t h a t  on t h i s  measure of 
accuracy slowly growing populat ions a r e  more p r e c i s e  than f a s t e r  
growing ones. These two cons ide ra t ions  might a t  t h e  very o u t s i d e  
ha lve  t h e  e s t ima te  o f  e r r o r ,  which would be equiva lent  t o  saying 
t h a t  t h e  b e t t i n g  odds t h a t  t h e  Korean populat ion w i l l  be between 
55.9 and 75.2 m i l l i o n  i n  2030 a r e  n o t  2:1 bu t  r a t h e r  20:l. 
This c a l c u l a t i o n  must be modifed i n  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  t h e  world 
population. The es t ima te  of e r r o r  was based on ind iv idua l  coun- 
t r i e s ,  and aggregates  o f  c o u n t r i e s  w i l l  have l e s s  e r r o r  i n  t h e  
measure i n  which o f f s e t t i n g  can be expected. The second po in t  
i s  advanced wi thmore  h e s i t a t i o n .  I f  we t h i n k  t h a t  t h e  evolu t ion  
of m o r t a l i t y  cannot bu t  be such t h a t  bare  replacement w i l l  be 
obtained wi th in  a l i m i t e d  span of yea r s ,  then  w e  can hope t h a t  
t h a t  span of  years  w i l l  provide a confidence i n t e r v a l  on which 
w e  could b e t .  I f  w e  consider  t h a t  we a r e  coming t o  such a po in t  
i n  t h e  evolu t ion  of  populat ion t h a t  replacement i s  95 percent  
c e r t a i n  a s  a world average wi th in  20 t o  40 years ,  then  w e  can, 
correspondingly,  b e t  20 t o  1 t h a t  t h e  world populat ion by t h e  
year  2030 w i l l  be between 8 and 11 b i l l i o n ,  t o  use round f igures .  
To summarize t h e  s t u d i e s  of e r r o r :  
1. A round f i g u r e  t h a t  summarizes t h e  e r r o r  o f  p a s t  projec- 
t i o n s  i s  t h a t  they have an average abso lu te  depar ture  from t h e  
subsequent performance of 0.3 percentage po in t s  o f  inc rease  p e r  
year.  
2. F a s t e r  growing popula t ions  have l a r g e r  e r r o r ,  s ay  0.5 
percentage  p o i n t s ,  wh i l e  t hose  t h a t  a r e  nea r  s t a t i o n a r i t y  show 
about  0.2 percentage  p o i n t s .  
3. The s k i l l  and c a r e  incoporated i n  t h e  f o r e c a s t  seem t o  
have less r e l a t i o n  t o  accuracy t h a n  t h e  t i m e  when t h e  f o r e c a s t  
was made. Fo recas t s  tended t o  be low i n  t h e  1940s f o r  developed 
c o u n t r i e s  because t h e  e x t e n t  o f  t h e  baby boom was n o t  foreseen ,  
f o r  t h e  less developed because of t h e  subsequent  u n a n t i c i p a t e d  
f a l l  of  m o r t a l i t y .  
4.  S i z e  o f  country ,  and whether r i c h  o r  poor,  h a s  a lmost  
no independent effect  on accuracy f o r  c o u n t r i e s  o f  g iven  r a t e  o f  
i n c r e a s e .  
5. A most impor tan t  constancy i s  wi th  t h e  p r o j e c t i o n  span- 
accuracy on our  measure seems unaf fec t ed  by whether one i s  fore-  
c a s t i n g  5 o r  20 y e a r s  ahead. Ex t r apo la t ion  of  t h i s  constancy 
pe rmi t s  s t a t emen t s  about  t h e  e r r o r  o f  f o r e c a s t s  30 o r  more y e a r s  
ahead, on which w e  have no d i r e c t  exper ience.  
6. The conc lus ion  a r i s i n g  from t h i s  is  t h a t  f o r  t h e  next  
10 t o  20 yea r s  w e  can provide  f o r e c a s t s  o f  r ea sonab le  accuracy; 
beyond t h a t  t h e  popu la t ion  is  e s s e n t i a l l y  unknowable. That 
should be taken  i n t o  account  i n  any conc lus ions  drawn on  ou r  
p r o j e c t i o n s  f o r t h e  n e x t  50 yea r s .  They a r e  t o  be  cons idered  
i l l u s t r a t i v e ,  s u i t e d  t o  inco rpora t ing  i n  h y p o t h e t i c a l  s cena r ios .  
7. A q u a l i f i c a t i o n  on t h e  above i s  t h a t  p r o j e c t i o n  methods 
may now be b e t t e r  t h a n  they  w e r e  i n  t h e  1940s and 1950s. C e r -  
t a i n l y  over  t h e  20 o r  s o  y e a r s  t h a t  it i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  fol low 
t h e r e  i s  a c l e a r  downtrend i n  t h e  e r r o r .  Fo recas t s  i n  t h e  1940s 
showed a mean d e p a r t u r e  of about  0.7 percentage  p o i n t s ;  t h o s e  
of t h e  1960s a mean d e p a r t u r e  of less than  0.3 percentage  p o i n t s .  
W e  may c a u t i o u s l y  a c c e p t  t h e  downtrend a s  r e a l ,  even though a 
longe r  series i s  needed be fo re  one can be s u r e .  
8. Forecas t s  f o r  a r e a s  w i t h i n  c o u n t r i e s  have been s u b j e c t  
t o  much more e r r o r  t han  f o r e c a s t s  f o r  e n t i r e  c o u n t r i e s .  That 
encourages u s  t o  t h i n k  t h a t  f o r e c a s t s  f o r  groups of c o u n t r i e s  
and f o r  t h e  world may w e l l  be b e t t e r  t han  t h e  n a t i o n a l  f o r e c a s t s  
on which most o f  o u r  obse rva t ions  of f o r e c a s t i n g  e r r o r  have been 
made. 
9. V a r i a t i o n  among writers, say on t h e  world popula t ion  
of t h e  y e a r  2000, i s  sma l l e r  t han  one would expec t  if t h e i r  
e s t i m a t e s  were independent.  Agreement on t h e  f u t u r e  among fo re -  
c a s t s  g ives  l i t t l e  assurance  t h a t  they a r e  c o r r e c t .  
10. For most popula t ions  f o r e c a s t s  by age and s e x  a r e  n o t  
no tab ly  more a c c u r a t e  t han  f o r e c a s t s  made wi thout  t a k i n g  account  
o f  age and sex ,  though popula t ions  whose ages  a r e  f a r  from t h e  
s t a b l e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  corresponding t o  t h e i r  age and s e x  a r e  ex- 
cep t ions  t o  t h i s  s ta tement .  W e  have c a r r i e d  o u t  ou r  c a l c u l a t i o n s  
by age and s e x  because t h e s e  a r e  needed f o r  t h e i r  own sake r a t h e r  
t han  f o r  any hope o f  improving t h e  t o t a l .  
11. Any l a b o r  f o r c e  e s t ima tes  a r e  based on t h e  popu la t ion  
f o r e c a s t s  by age and sex ,  applying t o  t h e s e  t h e  f r a c t i o n  fore-  
c a s t  a s  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e .  S ince  t h e  l a t t e r  a r e  
n e c e s s a r i l y  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e i r  own errors, t h e  a b s o l u t e  l a b o r  f o r c e  
e s t ima tes  a r e  s u b j e c t  t o  g r e a t e r  error t h a n  popula t ion .  
2.4. Meanhng o f  t h e  V a r i a n t s  
It  has  been t h e  custom t o  p r e s e n t  n o t  one p r o j e c t i o n  v a r i -  
a n t  b u t  t h r e e  o r  more. I n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  less stress has been 
l a i d  on t h e  h igh  and low v a r i a n t s ,  p a r t l y  because they  a r e  hard  
t o  i n t e r p r e t  i n  p r o b a b i l i t y  terms. A f t e r  t h e  ha r sh  exper ience  
of e r r o r ,  e s p e c i a l l y  of t h e  popula t ion  forecasts made i n  t h e  
1940s, what h igh  and low v a r i a n t s  have been publ i shed  show a 
cons ide rab le  range between lower and upper v a r i a n t s ,  b u t  even 
so ,  no one t h i n k s  t h a t  t h e s e  a r e  r e a l l y  lower and upper bounds 
on t h e  p o s s i b l e  f u t u r e  popula t ion .  
One way o f  i n t e r p r e t i n g  them i s  t o  see i n  what p o r t i o n  of 
ca ses  they  have s t r a d d l e d  t h e  r e a l i z a t i o n .  For  i n s t a n c e  o u t  of 
5 e s t ima tes  o f  t h e  1965 United S t a t e s  popula t ion  made from 1947 
onwards 4 s t r a d d l e d .  Taking a l l  of  t h e  26 f o r e c a s t s  on t h e  
record  from 1947 t o  1972 t h a t  can  be compared wi th  what subse- 
quent ly  happened w e  f i n d  t h a t  i n  8 cases t h e  lowes t  and t h e  
h i g h e s t  s t r a d d l e d  t h e  l a t e r  populat ion.  The high l e v e l  Popula- 
t i o n  I n v e s t i g a t i o n  Committee o f  London i n  1947 made 16 e s t i m a t e s  
of  t h e  popula t ion  of Great B r i t a i n  f o r  1977, and 15 of t h e s e  
tu rned  o u t  t o  be low; t h e  h i g h e s t  o f  t h e  16 w a s  about  r i g h t .  
While t h e  range between high and low v a r i a n t s  publ ished by 
d i f f e r e n t  au thor s  v a r i e s ,  s tudy  shows t h a t  i n  gene ra l  they a r e  
somewhat wider than  a  50 pe rcen t  confidence i n t e r v a l ;  one could 
b e t  something l i k e  2:1 odds t h a t  they w i l l  s t r a d d l e  t h e  subse- 
quent  popula t ion  performance. 
3. POLICY 
I n  some c o u n t r i e s  popula t ion  i s  seen  a s  a  problem, one t h a t  
r e q u i r e s  t o  be  reso lved  by an  a c t i v e  p o l i c y  on t h e  p a r t  of  
government; elsewhere popula t ion  i s  no more a  s u b j e c t  of p o l i c y  
than  i s  c l imate .  It  i s  t r u e  t h a t  many measures, from income 
t a x  t o  subs id ized  housing, do a f f e c t  t h e  b i r t h  r a t e ,  b u t  w e  do 
n o t  count  t h e s e  where t h e  o b j e c t i v e  i s  u n r e l a t e d  t o  populat ion.  
Phenomenal v a r i a t i o n  appears  among c o u n t r i e s  i n  how popula t ion  
i s  perceived and i n  t h e  degree t o  which a c t i o n  on it i s  thought 
t o  be requi red .  
For France popula t ion  i s  one of t h e  g r e a t  i s s u e s ;  i n  t h e  
words of Giscard d t E s t a i n g ,  t h e  country needs t o  know "whether 
France i s  going t o  s u f f e r  a  popula t ion  decrease  o r  conserve i t s  
v i t a l i t y "  (Le Monde, A p r i l  20, 1979). I t  i s  some t i m e  s i n c e  
t h e s e  two elements,  popula t ion  decrease  and v i t a l i t y ,  have been 
con t ra s t ed .  Giscard wanted e s p e c i a l l y  t h a t  pa ren t s  have t h r e e  
o r  more c h i l d r e n ,  and over  a  two yea r  per iod  he arranged a  45 
pe rcen t  i n c r e a s e  above i n f l a t i o n  i n  family allowances.  On t h e  
o t h e r  hand, Germany, perhaps with unpleasant  memories of e a r l i e r  
p o l i c i e s ,  has  l e f t  popula t ion  seve re ly  a lone ,  d e s p i t e  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  i t s  b i r t h  r a t e  has been s t r i k i n g l y  below 
t h a t  of France. U n t i l  a  yea r  o r  two ago German b i r t h s  were 
a c t u a l l y  less than  dea ths ;  it i s  t h e  l a r g e s t  country so  f a r  t o  
have a t t a i n e d  nega t ive  popula t ion  growth, and i n  t h i s  capac i ty  
can be an example t o  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  have popula t ions  growing 
much t o o  f a s t  f o r  t h e i r  development. 
A s i m i l a r  c o n t r a s t  appears  between t h e  US and t h e  USSR. 
These two c o u n t r i e s  experienced high b i r t h s  a f t e r  t h e  war, 
reaching  peaks , respec t ive ly ,of  4.3 and 5.3 m i l l i o n  i n  t h e  e a r l y  
1 9 6 0 ~ ~  and saw t h e i r  b i r t h s  d e c l i n e  g r e a t l y  du r ing  t h e  1960s, 
t h a t  d e c l i n e  being followed i n  both  cases  by some l e v e l l i n g  o r  
, 
rise i n  t h e  1970s. A t  no p o i n t  d i d  t h e u n i t e d  S t a t e s  contemplate  
p o l i c y  f o r  r a i s i n g  i t s  b i r t h  rate,  and t h e  ve ry  i n f l u e n t i a l  
Rocke fe l l e r  Commission, i n  whose work many d i s t i n g u i s h e d  demo- 
graphers  p a r t i c i p a t e d ,  r epo r t ed  emphat ica l ly  t h a t  t h e  United 
S t a t e s  popula t ion  w a s  i f  any th ing  t o o  l a r g e ,  and whatever p o l i c y  
w a s  t o  be cons idered  should have as i t s  a i m  k e e ~ i n g  b i r t h s  and 
immigration low. 
The USSR, on t h e  o t h e r  hand, has  been much concerned about  
i t s  slowing ra te  of i n c r e a s e .  That  i n c r e a s e  i n  a b s o l u t e  terms 
s t i l l  averaged 2 . 3  m i l l i o n  p e r  yea r  i n  t h e  1970s, i t s  lowes t  
decade,  s l i g h t l y  more than  t h e  United S t a t e s .  Y e t  p o ~ u l a t i o n  
came up as a s e r i o u s  problem a t  t h e  Twenty-Fifth Congress of  t h e  
Communist P a r t y ,  and i s  r epea t ed ly  mentioned as a problem by 
S o v i e t  demographers. The d i s t i n g u i s h e d  s c h o l a r  V. Petevedentsev 
(Demeny 1980:169-174) warns t h a t  when t h e  s m a l l  c o h o r t s  born i n  
t h e  1960s r each  r ep roduc t ive  age i n  t h e  1980s t h e  b i r t h s  w i l l  
d e c l i n e  i f  family  s i z e  i s  n o t  i nc reased .  H e  s a y s  t h a t  " I t  i s  
e s s e n t i a l  t o  i n c r e a s e  f e r t i l i t y ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  o r d e r  t o  p reven t  
t h e  format ion of  a new demographic 'wave1... E f f e c t i v e  measures 
must be  taken  t o  s t i m u l a t e  f e r t i l i t y . "  H e  la ter  mentions " . . . t he  
d e t e r i o r a t i o n  o f  t h e  demographic s i t u a t i o n  r e f e r r e d  t o  a t  t h e  
Twenty-Fifth Congress of  t h e  dommunist P a r t y  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  Union 
[ t h a t ]  conf i rms t h e  need f o r  s t r o n g  encouragement of f e r t i l i t y . "  
O f f i c i a l  measures i n c l u d e  extended ma te rn i ty  l e a v e  wi th  p a r t i a l  
pay and h e  urges  t h a t  t h e  pay be generous.  Whereas t h e  United 
S t a t e s  i s  prepared  t o  see i t s  popu la t ion  grow by immigration,  
of which an  i n d e f i n i t e  amount i s  a v a i l a b l e  from poor c o u n t r i e s ,  
t h e  USSR does n o t  cons ide r  immigration b u t  s t i m u l a t e s  b i r t h s .  
The advent  of  demographic waves p l a i n l y  does  harm t o  an 
economy, and t h i s  q u i t e  independent ly  o f  t h e  system under which 
it ope ra t e s .  Schools  have t o  be b u i l t  and then  c lo sed  down; 
t h a t  is  expensive i n  t h e  US as i n  t h e  USSR. Y e t  w e  do no t  f i n d  
i n  t h e  w r i t i n g s  o f  American demographers any promotion o f  a 
p o l i c y  t h a t  would avoid  o r  dampen waves. Counter -cyc l ica l  fam- 
i l y  a l lowances  have n o t  been s e r i o u s l y  d i scussed .  David Heer 
(1977) examines t h e s e  and o t h e r  q u e s t i o n s  on t h e  b a s i s  of i n t e r -  
views of  S o v i e t  demographers i n  1975-1976. How t o  p reven t  t h e  
high b i r t h  r a t e s  of  t h e  Asian r e p u b l i c s  from r e t a r d i n g  t h e i r  
economic advance was one o f  t h e  i s s u e s  mentioned. 
Rais ing f e r t i l i t y  has  been a p a r t i c u l a r  concern o f  t h e  coun- 
tr ies of Eas t e rn  Europe, and f o r  a t i m e  it looked a s  through t h e  
measures adopted w e r e  having t h e  d e s i r e d  e f f e c t .  The sudden with- 
drawal of permiss ion f o r  l e g a l  a b o r t i o n s i n O c t o b e r  1966 v i r t u a l l y  
doubled t h e  b i r t h  r a t e  from 1966 t o  1967 (Berelson 1979:,209). A t  
t h e  same t i m e  t h e  impor ta t ion  of  c o n t r a c e p t i v e s  was d i scont inued  
though some s e e m  t o  have been a v a i l a b l e  c l a n d e s t i n e l y .  Other 
measures taken i n c l u d e  matern i ty  l e a v e ,  d ivo rce  r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  
c h i l d b i r t h  compensation f o r  t h i r d  and l a t e r  c h i l d ,  change i n  in -  
come t a x  r e l a t e d  t o  number of  dependents-but such measures had 
e x i s t e d  be fo re  wi thout  having much e f f e c t  on f e r t i l i t y .  T e i t e l -  
baum (1972) concludes  from t h e  sha rp  d e c l i n e s  i n  f e r t i l i t y  s i n c e  
1968 t h a t  t h e  d r a s t i c  f e r t i l i t y  i n c r e a s e s  r e s u l t i n g  from t h e  1966 
l e g a l  s h i f t  may be t r a n s i t o r y .  The a b s o l u t e  number of  b i r t h s  is  
n o t  t h e  r i g h t  measure, s i n c e  age d i s t r i b u t i o n s  a r e  changing. The 
expected number of  c h i l d r e n  t h a t  would be born t o  a woman i n  
Rumania was 2.72 on t h e  r a t e s  of  1974; down t o  2.60 i n  1977. 
Other c o u n t r i e s  were lower and have f a l l e n  more-for i n s t a n c e ,  
Hungary was a t  2.39 i n  1975, and down t o  2.14 i n  1977 ( P r e s s a t  
1979:533). Eas t  Germany touched t h e  low p o i n t  o f  1.54 i n  1974, 
and has  s i n c e  r i s e n  s l i g h t l y  t o  1.85, s t i l l  f a r  below replacement.  
Of a l l  c o u n t r i e s ,  Bulgar ia  has  had t h e  most d i r e c t  s y s t e p  
of p o s i t i v e  i n c e n t i v e s .  Recognizing t h a t  most couples  w i l l  have 
a f i r s t  c h i l d  i n  any c a s e ,  it gave generous al lowances f o r  second 
and e s p e c i a l l y  f o r  t h i r d  and l a t e r  c h i l d r e n .  But i t s  f e r t i l i t y  
i s  a l s o  h e s i t a t i n g ;  t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  cannot  be c a l l e d  a resounding 
success .  Most o f  t h e  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  of  Eas t e rn  Europe now d i f -  
f e r e n t i a t e  al lowances accord ing  t o  t h e  o r d e r  of t h e  c h i l d .  I t  
w i l l  t a k e  f u r t h e r  t i m e  t o  judge t h e  r e s u l t s ,  b u t  t h e  f i r s t  analy- 
sis i s  n o t  encouraging. 
Ind ian  p o l i c y  t o  c u r t a i l  b i r t h s  has  had i t s  ups and downs 
(Kocher 1980:299). M r s .  Gandhi 's  un fo r tuna te  a t tempt  t o  apply 
coerc ion  was a major f a c t o r  i n  h e r  d e f e a t  i n  1977. The govern- 
ment t h a t  followed was more conse rva t ive  i n  a l l  r e s p e c t s ,  in-  
c lud ing  family  p lanning ,  b u t  it d i d  i n c r e a s e  t h e  fami ly  planning 
budget t o n e a r l y  (US)$ 2 0 0  mil l ion  annual ly,  a s  wel l  a s  t h e  h e a l t h  
budget, t h e  l a t t e r  a l s o  with population c o n t r o l  o b j e c t i v e s  i n  
mind. The S i x t h  Five-Year Plan covering t h e y e a r s  1978-1983 does 
not  i d e n t i f y  r ap id  population growth a s  a major o b s t a c l e  t o  econ- 
omic advance a s  previous p lans  had done. Meanwhile t h e  e l e c t i o n  
of January 1980 brought Mrs. Gandhi back t o  power, now with l e s s  
d r a s t i c  populat ion p o l i c i e s .  The ine f f i c i ency  o f  t h e  governmental 
machinery f o r  motivat ing family planning and disseminat ing equip,- 
ment has  been a concern, and t h e r e i s  some hope of t igh ten ing ,  now 
wi th in  a framework of  voluntary  l i m i t a t i o n .  An encouraging fea- 
t u r e  of t h e  Indian  s i t u a t i o n  i s  t h e  impressive f a l l  i n  f e r t i l i t y  
i n  some of  t h e  more progress ive  s t a t e s ,  inc luding  Kerala,  Tamil 
Nadu, and t h e  Punjab. 
On t h e  whole t h e  promise o f  Indian planning i s  l e s s  than t h a t  
of China. China i s  t h e  f i r s t  country t o  a t t a i n  a b i l l i o n  people, 
b u t  Ind ia  i s  l i k e l y  t o  overtake it on p r e s e n t  prospects ,  and it 
could reach a b i l l i o n  and a h a l f  i f  dea th  r a t e s  do n o t  r i s e  i n  
t h e  meantime. 
The above cons idera t ion  of p o l i c y  i s  included he re  t o  show 
t h e  awkward r e l a t i o n  t o  forecas t ing .  Any f o r e c a s t  i s  an i n p l i e d  
judgment on t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  and success of a populat ion pol icy  
A demographer i s  n o t  the '  r i b h t  professionai- i f  t h e r e  i s  any-to 
judge t h e  competence and e f fec t iveness  of  governments. By making 
t h e  f o r e c a s t  an e x t r a p o l a t i o n  i n  one form o r  another  of b i r t h  
and death s e r i e s ,  t h e  demographer avoids t h e  burden of e x p l i c i t l y  
judging t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  population p o l i c i e s .  
4 .  A CONTRIBUTION TO TECHNIQUE 
We can make no pre tense  i n  t h i s  paper of fo recas t ing  n a t i o n a l  
populat ions more accura te ly  than o t h e r s  a r e  doing. The way we 
a s s e s s  o t h e r  f o r e c a s t s ,  and then use them t o  check and a d j u s t  ours  
may c o n s t i t u t e  an advance. What we have done i s  t o  work out  t h e  
populat ion of each country f o r  the  year  2000 on t h e  suppos i t ion  
t h a t  replacement would be a t t a i n e d  by 1990-1995, 1995-2000, e t c . ,  
s o  obta in ing  a s c a l e  of values f o r  t h e  yea r  2000, on which we 
could p lace  previous f o r e c a s t s  such a s  those of t h e  United Nations 
and t h e  World Bank. This  t akes  t h e  p lace  of a s tudy of t h e i r  
documentation t o  f i n d  the  assumptions t h a t  underly t h e i r  work. 
There a r e  reasons why those concerned with f u t u r e  popula- 
t i o n s  do no t  o f t e n  t a k e  t h e  time t o  f u l l y  comprehend t h e  assump- 
t i o n s  embodied-in t h e  f o r e c a s t s  of o t h e r s .  I n  t h e  f i r s t  p lace  
t h e  documentation i s  o f t e n  incomplete; moreover even when t h e  
assumptions a r e  a c t u a l l y  w r i t t e n  down they a r e  hard t o  d i g  o u t  
of t h e  f i n e  p r i n t .  We have been unable t o  d u p l i c a t e  t h e  a r i t h -  
matic used by anyone e l s e ,  and do no t  expect  anyone e l s e  t o  be 
a b l e  t o  reproduce ours .  Even i f  t h e  b a r r i e r  of understanding 
t h e  algorithms of o t h e r s  could be surmounted, t h e  labor  requi red  
t o  reproduce t h e i r  numbers would be g r e a t .  I t  seems much pre- 
f e r a b l e  t o  s e t  up a s c a l e  with a known s e t  of assumptions, and 
then i n  a sense work backwards t o  i n f e r  what assumptions a r e  in-  
volved i n  t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n s  of o the r s .  
An example f o r  t h e  case  of B r a z i l  w i l l  show t h e  technique. 
The c a l c u l a t i o n  with replacement by t h e  per iod 2000-2005 gave 
191,000 and by t h e  per iod 2015-2020, 15 yea r s  l a t e r ,gave206 ,000 .  
These might be thought of  a s  re ference  p o i n t s ,  t o  which we can 
r e l a t e  t h e  s e v e r a l  e x t a n t  f o r e c a s t s .  The Population Reference 
Bureau shows 199 m i l l i o n  a n d t h e w o r l d  Bank 200 mi l l ion ,  i n t e r -  
mediate between our two reference  po in t s .  The United Nations 
g ives  187 m i l l i o n ,  t h e  United S t a t e s  Bureau of t h e  Census 226 
mil l ion ,  t h e  one implying t h e  at ta inment  of  bare replacement a t  
some time i n  t h i s  century ,  t h e  o t h e r  l a t e r  than 2015-2020. The 
Community and Family Study Center of t h e  Univers i ty  of Chicago 
gave 187 mi l l ion ,  a l s o  implying replacement by some time i n  t h e  
p resen t  century.  With these  e s t ima tes  and t h e  s c a l e  by which 
we could eva lua te  them before us ,  we determined 2000-2005 a s  t h e  
time when replacement would be reached, and s o  our  number of t h e  
yea r  2000 is  191 mi l l ion .  Though throughout t h i s  work we took 
i n t o  account t h e  o t h e r  es t imates ,  we put  ours  toward t h e  low end 
of t h e i r  d i s t r i b u t i o n .  
5. TABLES PRESENTED 
This s e c t i o n  concludes t h e  paper with a s e t  of t a b l e s  t h a t  
f o r e c a s t  populat ions over t h e  next  50 years .  We show t h e  numbers 
a t  10-year i n t e r v a l s  from 1980 t o  2030 f o r  ind iv idua l  coun t r i e s ,  
inc luding  a l l  of  those with over  250,000 population a s  repor ted  
by t h e  United Nat ions ,  They a r e  a l s o  aggregated i n t o  t h r e e  ca t e -  
g o r i e s  of  less developed and t h r e e  c a t e g o r i e s  of more developed 
c o u n t r i e s .  Corresponding in format ion  i s  provided f o r  l a b o r  fo rce .  
The t a b l e s  t h a t  a r e  p re sen ted  a r e  a smal l  s e l e c t i o n  from 
t h e  e x t e n s i v e  p r i n t o u t s  a v a i l a b l e ,  These show a l l  c o u n t r i e s  a t  
f i v e  y e a r  i n t e r v a l s ,  i n  f ive-year  age groups,  by sex ,  f o r  t h e  100 
y e a r s  from 1975. W e  have l i t t l e  conf idence  i n  ou r  long-term pro- 
j e c t i o n s ,  f o r  reasons  t h a t  appear  above i n  t h e  s e c t i o n  devoted t o  
t h e  e r r o r  of  f o r e c a s t s .  The e r r o r s  apply a f o r t i o r i  t o  t h e  l a b o r  
f o r c e ,  where w e  have depended on p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e s  provided by 
t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Labor O f f i c e  up t o  t h e  y e a r  2000; t h e  y e a r s  be- 
yond 2000 a r e  t aken  a t  t h e  2000 p a r t i c i p a t i o n  rates. 
Table 1. Popula t ion  p r o j e c t i o n s  f o r  t h e  nex t  50 yea r s  f o r  c o u n t r i e s  w i th  more than  250,000 
i n h a b i t a n t s ?  
Category 1980 1990 2000 2020 2030 20 10 
nfganistan 16057. 20927. 26832. 33020. 38174. 431 15. 
albania 277 1 . 3479. 4034. 4598. 5080. 5452. 
algeria 18969. 26290. 352 15. 44765. 52802. 60534. 
ango 1 a 7049. 8993. 1 1369. 13830. 15905. 1 7894. 
argent i na 2690 1 . 29766. 32 172. 34 139. 35909. 37273. 
australia 14413. 1 5907. 171 17. 18134. 18980. 19564. 
austria 7579. 7774. 7947. 81 16. 8255. 8337. 
bang 1 adesh 85964. 111661. 142964. 175243. 202833. 228848. 
barbados 262. 304. 336. 368. 397. 417. 
b e  1 g i um 9928. 10223. 10417. 1059 1. 10701. 10750. 
b e n i n  3502. 4618. 5979. 739 1 . 8578. 9718. 
bhu tan 1301. 1629. 1994. 2343. 2628. 2909. 
bol ivia 5640. 7283. 9024. 10512. 11938. 1 3234. 
bo tswana 818. 1098. 1420. 1727. 1982. 2233. 
braz i 1 123775. 1 57404. 190561. 2 18666. 244966. 267589. 
bulgaria 8976. 9323. 9530. 9663. 9709. 9770. 
burma 351 13. 43550. 52386. 59765. 6682 1 . 73 190. 
burundi 4207. 5295. 6630. 8111. 9599. 10852. 
cambodi a 7906. 9855. 11932. 13892. 15539. 17101. I 
canada 23805. 26054. 27646. 29000. 29388. 30440. 3 
cape verde 330. 406. 473. 530. 583. 623. I 
central african republic 2284. 2842. 3495. 4108. 4626. 5141. 
chad 4475. 5555. 6805. 7992. 8986. 997 1 . 
chi le 1 1  107. 1 3056. 14758. 16167. 17439. 18362. 
china 983000. 1 1 13000. 1223000. 1314000. 1 383000. 1423000. 
colombia 26384. 33447. 39778. 45058. 50268. 54278. 
comoros 344. 438. 530. 605. 682. 745. 
congo 1520. 1932. 2425. 2927. 3350. 3754. 
costa rica 2237. 284 1 . 3378. 3825. 4257. 4579. 
cuba 10127. 1 1699. 13040. 14290. 15302. 16039. 
cyprus 643. 708. 757. 801. 835. 851. 
czechoslovakia 1531 1. 1603 1. 16631. 1 7253. 17661. 17955. 
denmark 5148. 5312, 5438. 5545. 562 1 . 5639. 
dominican republic 6054. 7664. 891 1. 10258. 11371. 12262. 
ecuador 809 1 . 10804. 13643. 16054. 18369. 20444. 
egyp t 41621. 51781. 61861. 70394. 78368. 85266. 
el salvador 485 1.  6473. 8183. 9615. 10995. 12230. 
equatorial gu i n e a  360. 444. 510. 631. 707. 783. 
ethiopia 32747. 42623. 54689. 67267. 77858. 8S008. 
fiji 646. 791. 911. 1017. 1 106. 1167. 
f inland 3809. 4972. 5049. 5107. 5111. 5053. 
france 54080. 56855. 59225. 6 1453. 63033. 63082. 
gabon 545. 608. 679. 747. 805. 860. 
gamb i a 593. 767. 976. 1193. 1375. 1 549. 
german dem. rep. 16791. 1694 1. 171 1 1 .  17276. 17315. 17232. 
germany, fed. rep. of 6 1627. 6 1977. 62280. 62090. 6 1668. 61051. 
ghana 11545. 1 5229. 19523. 23604. 26969. 30356. 
greece 9255. 9686. 10030. 10282. 10494. 10665. 
- -- 
a Calculations for China are based on constant birth cohorts of 20 million per y e a r f i ~ m  1980 on; the procedure for 
these ~roiections is described in Keyfitz (1982). -- 
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T a b l e  1 c o n t i n u e d .  
Ca tegory  1 9 8 0  1990  2 0 0 0  2010  2 0 2 0  2 0 3 0  
pakistan 87285. 1 14797. 143580. 167548. 190S03. 21 1489. 
p an ama 1919. 2433. 29 14. 3309. 3697. 3999. 
papua n e w  guinea 3111. 3929. 4830. 5678. 6378. 7363. 
Paraguay 3154. 4192. 5229. 6120. 6967. 7705. 
peru 17735. 22956. 283 19. 32832. 37131. 40926. 
philippines 499 10. 64433. 77708. 88767. 99695. 105305. 
poland 35755. 38600. 40616. 425 18. 43739. 44486. 
p o i  tugal 9904. 10842. 12318. 1 2963. 13456. 11611. 
portuguese timor 754. 938. 1134. 1298. 1456. 1598. 
puerto rico 3379. 395 1 . 445 1 . 4877. 5247. 5497. 
reunion 537. 668. 792. 902. 995. 1071 . 
roman i a 22157. 23683. 25 132. 26255. 27140. 27955. 
rwanda 4773. 6420. 8549. 11014. 1 3538. 15G83. 
saudi arabia 8490. 11395. 14962. 18760. 21893. 24929. 
senegal 5656. 732 1 . 9339. 11427. 13188. 14872. 
s ie r ra  leone 3440. 4377. 5458. 6482. 7333. 8180. 
si ngapore 2448. 285 1 .  3 162. 343 1 . 364 1 . 3758. 
soma1 i a 3520. 4504. 5752. 7157. 8570. 9772. 
southern rhodesia 73 10. 9856. 1 2925. 16887. 18745. 21284. 
spai n 37512. 41 144. 43952. 46495. 48683. 50137. 1 
s r i  lanka 151 18. 18344. 2C3967. 23380. 25534. 27125. w 
sudan 18351. 23695. 29772. 35639. 40405. 45179. \P 
surinam 425. 593. 755. 882. 1026. 1142. 
swazi 1 and 553. 716. 905. 1085. 1234. 1383. 
sweden 8245. 8305. 8333. 8367. 8388. 836 1 . 
s w i  tzerland 6509. 6719. 6876. 6979. 7018. 6996. 
syrian arab republic 8879. 12341. 16096. 19244. 22324. 25 120. 
Ihai land 48300. 62004. 74778. 8534 1 . 95888. 104269. 
t o g o  2626. 3446. 4433. 5449. 6306. 7123. 
trinidad and tobago 1192. 1429. 1622. 1792. 1943. 2045. 
tunisia 6457. 8335. 11494. 12976. 14 1'76. 10065. 
turkey 45260. 56009. 6145 1 . 72806. 80357. 86 190. 
u . s . s . ~ .  266077. 29 1222. 309623. 324956. 33622 1 . 314850. 
uganda 13029. 17040. 2 18'34. 26644. 3072 1 . 34587. 
o n  i ted kingdom 56672. 58225. 59456. 606 16. 61824. 62552. 
united republic of oameroon 8379. 10432. 12865. 1 5353. 17467. 19468. 
united republic of tanzania 17779. 2368 1 . 3 1245. 39823. -18534. 5595 1 . 
u n i  ted s ta tes  220765. 236650. 247866. 258205. 2G6270. 276080, 
upper volta 689 1 .  8858. 1 1  147. 13329. 15135. 16936. 
Uruguay 298 1 . 3268. 3500. 3697. 38SS. 4047. 
venezuela 15233. 19926. 24605. 2854 1 . 3224 1 . 35426. 
vietnam 53658. 66307. 78462. 8858 1 . 9893 1 . 107478. 
windward islands 440. 587. 725. 839. 963. 1060. 
yemen 598 1 . 767 1 .  9705. 11646. 13269. 13934 .' 
yemen, democrat i o  1894. 2483. 3185. 3849. 440 1 . 496 1 . 
yugoslavia 22317. 24049. 25383. 27098. 27564. 26426. 
zaire 25064. 36099. 45663. 5545 1 . 63634. 71389. 
zamb i a 5710. 7649. 10018. 12480. 14549. 16538. 
Table 2. Popula t ion  p r o j e c t i o n s  of aggrega ted  c o u n t r i e s  w i th  less than  250,000 i n h a b i t a n t s .  
Category 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 
o t h e r  e a s t  a f r i c a  
o : h e r  m idd l e  a f r i c a  
o t h e r  n o r t h e r n  a f r i c a  
o l h e r  m idd l e  amer i ca  
o t h e r  t r o p i c a l  s o u t h  amer i ca  
o t h e r  n o r t h e r n  amer i ca  
r e s i d u a l  o t h e r  e a s t  a s i a  
o t h e r  e a s t e r n  s o u t h  a s i a  
o t h e r  middle  s o u t h  a s i a  
o t h e r  w e s t e r n  s o u t h  a s i a  
r e s i d u a l  w es t e rn  s o u t h  a s i a  
o t h e r  n o r t h e r n  europe  
o t h e r  s o u t h e r n  europe  
o t h e r  w e s t e r n  europe  
o t h e r  Car ibbean  
o t h e r  m e l a n e s i a  
o t h e r  p o l y n e s i a  
Table  3. Aggregated p r o j e c t i o n s  r e s u l t i n g  from Tables  1 and 2. 
Category 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 
u . s . ,  c a nada ,  e t c .  
r ~ e s t e r n  eu rope  and j apan  
s o c i a l i s t  c o u n t r i e s  
p e t r o l e u m  e x p o r t e r s  
l d c ' s  more than 400  do1 
l d c ' s  l e s s  than 400  do1 
more deve loped  r e g i o n s  
l e s s  d e v e loped  r e g i o n s  
w o r l d ,  sum of o t h e r  p r o j e c t i o n s  
Table 4 .  Labor f o r c e  p r o j e c t i o n s . f o r  t h e  next  5 0  yea r s  f o r  c o u n t r i e s  wi th  more--than 250,000 
i n h a b i t a n t s .  
Category 
a f g a n i s t a n  
a l b a n i a  
n l g e r i a  
ango 1  a  
a r g e n t  i n a  
eus  t r a l  i a  
a u s t r i a  
bang 1  adesh  
ba rbados  
belgium 
ben in  
bhu t an  
b o l i v i a  
botswana 
b r a z i  1  
b u l g a r i a  
burma 
burundi  
cambodi a  
canada  
cape  verde  
c e n t r a l  a f r i c a n  r e p u b l i c  
chad 
c h i  l e  




c o s t a  r i c a  
cuba 
Cyprus 
c z e c h o s l o v a k i a  
denmark 
dominican r e p u b l i c  
ecuador  
egyp t  
e l  s a l v a d o r  
e q u a t o r i a l  g u i n e a  
e t h i o p i a  
f i j i  
f  i n l a n d  
f  r a n c e  23244. 25202. 
gabon 260. 280. 
gamb i  a  274. 345.  
german dem. r e p .  9012.  9522.  
germany, f e d .  r e p .  of 28792. 30019. 
ghana 4332.  5723. 
g r e e c e  3903. 41  19. 
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Table 5.  Labor force projections of aggregated countries with less than 250,000 inhabitants. 
Category 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 
u tller east af r i ca 
:her middle africa 
other northern africa 
other middle america 
~ i h e r  tropical south america 
other northern america 
residual other east asia 
other eastern south asia 
other middle south asia 
other western south asia 
residual western south asia 
other northern europe 
other southern europe 




Table 6. Aggregated projections resulting from Tables 4 and 5 .  
Category 1980 1990 2000 20 10 2020 2030 
u.s., canada, etc. 130165. 145055. 1601 15. 172936. 177159. 179723. 
western europe and japan 209460. 225039. 231125. 2395 16. 240237. 240606. 
socialist oountries 203822. 2 18487. 238264. 242694. 245454. 249508. 
petroleum exporters 1 1  1137. 142844. 185803. 2400 17. 293409. 336733. 
1Jc's more than 400 do1 1 10820. 144714. 1 87854. 232355. 267854 ; 290306. 
ldc's less than 400 do1 109061 1. 1366190. 1691 113. 2065267. 2365529. 2594 164. 
m Q r e  developed regions 543447. 58850 1 . 624804. 655 145. 662903. 670 136. 
less developed regions 1269280. . 1560334. 1932778. 2343099. 2680263. 2924087. 
::orld, sum of other projections 1812727. 2 148835. 2557582. 2998245. 3343 163. 3594224. 
Table  7. Ass.umed t i m e  i n t e r v a l  a t  which replacement  l e v e l  w i l l  be 
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